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10 28 The 10-to 20-foot flood wave traveled through the 15-mile Buffalo Creek valley at an average speed of about 7 feet per second ( 5 miles per hour) and reached the town of Man at the mouth of Buffalo Creek on the Guyandotte River around 11 :00 a.m. During those 3 hours, at least 118 lives were lost, 500 homes were destroyed, 4,000 people were left homeless, property damage exceeded $50 million and highway damage alone exceeded $15 million. Two months after the flood, seven people were still reported missing.
Unit weights (bulk density) of coal samples _ -----------------------------------------------3. Floods in southwestern West Virginia, February 25-27, 1972 --------------------------------
Between February 24 and 26, the National Weather Service measured precipitation of 3.7 inches in the general area of Logan County and Buffalo Creek. That amount of precipitation is about a 2-year rainfall; that is southweste1·n West Virginia can expect precipitati~n to equal or exceed 3.7 inches in a 3-day period on the average of once every 2 years. Streams similar to Buffalo Creek in and around Logan County responded to the 3 days of precipitation with flows on the order of a 10-year flood; that is, a flow that can be expected to occur on the average of about once in a 10-year period. Following the failure of the coal-waste dam, flow in Buffalo Creek near Saunders jumped from less than a 10-year flood to a discharge about 40 times greater than a 50-year flood. The dif-1 ference between the discharge less than a 10-year flood and the discharge 40 times greater than the 50-year flood reflects the difference between the natural flood that would probably have occurred and the flood that resulted from failure of the dam.
Employees of the Buffalo Creek Mining Co., OJlerators of the coal-waste dam that failed, report that water was within 1 foot of the graded crest of the dE.m 4 hours prior to the flood. Failure of the coal-waste dam probably occurred through foundation deficiences, causing sliding and slumping of the front face of the da~. The failure was accelerated by the waterlogged condition of the dam. The slumping lowered the top of the coal-waste dam and allowed the impounded water to breach and then rapidly erode the crest of the dam. Upon failure of the dam, the floodwater moved into pockets of burning coal waste at the lower coal-waste bank and caused explosions. The only signs of bur"'ing and explosions were at the lower coal-waste bani-. More detailed studies on the physical characteristics of material in the coal-waste dams in Middle Fork valley are now underway by the Department of Interior and the data cited in this report may be altered by these investigations.
Some of the facts, figures, and photographs used in this report were generously supplied by residents, newspapermen, and local, State, and Federal employees. Their help in producing this report is gratefully acknowledged.
SETTING GEOGRAPHY
From its headwaters on the northern flanks of Buffalo Mountain, Buffalo Creek has cut a zig-zag valley as it flows west to meet the Guyandotte River at Man in southwestern West Virginia. The curves that interrupt the general east to west flow of Buffalo Creek mark detours where the stream loops north or south around the noses and peaks of some of the more resistant ridges. The most prominent loop in the valley is at Stowe, about halfway between Saunders and Man. Here the creek flowf· northwest for about 0.7 mile between Lundale and Stowe before turning almost due south for 1.3 mi'les from Stowe at the top of the loop to Latrobe at the bottom.
The sinuosity of Buffalo Creek, that is, its tendency to zig-zag around ridges instead of flowing in a straight line, forces the stream to flow for 15 miles from Saunders to Man-a straight line distance of less than 12 miles. This sinuosity also impairs the ability of Buffalo c~eek to carry off floodflows ; each bend and turn acts as an impediment to flow and l'~cks up water and retains any flow longer than a straight channel would.
The flood plain of Buffalo Creek, the narrow, valley-bottom flatlands formed from materials deposited over the years by the stream, is gen-,eraHy less than 400 feet wide. People 't~gan to use this narrow flood plain for living space when mining developed in the region after 1900. In 1914, the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad completed a spur up the valley, and long coal trains began making daily runs dow1 the valley to the main line at Barboursville. By 1920, Buffalo was checkered with smar but closely-spaced mining camps, located wher~ the flood plain was widest. Towns such as r~un ders, Lorado, Craneco, Crites, Amhers':.dale, Becco, Accoville, and Crown were built ,~rhere the small flood plains of tributary str~ams joined the flood plain of Buffalo Creek; and towns such as Pardee, Stowe, and Robinette were built on the wider flatland around some of the loops of Buffalo Creek.
During the last half-century, the mining companies sold most of the houses to individuals, and the camps becam·e independent small communities. Before the flood, there were 17 settlements along Buffalo Creek. By 1972, the two-lane Buffalo Creek road had been improved and recently resurfaced. Before the flood, the road, railroad, and houses filled much of the flood plain, leaving only small space for the creek.
Over a long period of time, a stream such as Buffalo Creek will just fill its banks without overflowing about twice a year. Less often, but just as predictably, a stream can be expected to overflow its banks and flood the flood plain.
Jammed between steeply rising valley walls, the narrow flood plain of Buffalo Creek offers little opportunity to build above the level of the 50-year flood. Upstream from Amherstdale, the flood plain is less than 400 feet wide and above Saunders the flood plain almost disappears. Even downstream from Saunders, the valley becomes so narrow in places that there is barely room for the railroad and the road. At Saunders and Accoville, the ridges rise over 1,000 feet above the valley floor at an angle of about 26°; at Lorado and Amherstdale, the rise is even steeper, 30° to 35°, to a ridge that runs some 700-900 feet above the flood plain.
The steepness of the valley walls and the thinness of the soil contribute to floodflows in the valley. Gentle slopes and thick soils tend to slow up and absorb the runoff from heavy rains and thus delay and attenuate flood pe~ks. Instead of gentle slopes·, the valley walls· act more like high-pitched roofs with slopes as high as 40° and occasional 50-foot sandstone cliffs. Instead of thick soils to abs·orb some of the precipitation runoff, soils on the uplands and valley walls are-thin ; generally they are less than 3 feet thick and seldom are as much as 5 feet thick (Latimer, 1915) . Furthermore, the soils tend to a composition of low perrneability and are dominantly a clayey, silty sand with large quantities of stone varying ftom small chips to boulders a foot long and cpmmonly underlain by clay layers up to an ~nch thick between the base of the soil zone and I the under lying bedrock. , All these factors-the sinuosity of the ciiannel, the narrowness of the flood plain, the st~ep ness and height of the valley walls, and ':the thinness and relative impermeability of the soil-combine to make Buffalo Creek a hollow susceptible to natural flooding. During the extreme, nonnatural, flood of 1972, these factors also contributed to the flooding but played a lesser role to the overwhelming volume and force of water involved.
GEOLOGY
The ridges, valleys, and mineral wealth of Buffalo Creek hollow are a direct reflection of the bedrock geology. Buffalo G'.·eek and its tributaries are cut into the hig:t plateau that forms the western flank of the Appalachians. The valleys and hollows in thif area are so numerous and well developed trat very little remains of the upland of the plateau. As a result, the topography is a series of narrow, steep, sinuous headwater ridges flanked by equally steep and narrow spurs. Each major stream is an entity in itself and is separated from adjacent drainage basins by uniformly crested ridges with few gaps or saddles opening between basins. The remr ants of the plateau upland are at 2,400 to 2,€00 feet above sea level. The major valleys are about 1,200 feet below the upland, and tributary hollows are as much as 1,000 feet deep.
The topography around Buffalo Creek reflects the bedrock. Beneath the spurs and ridges are coal seams and related sz.ndstone and shale, all part of the Kanahwa Series (Pennsylvanian). The Kanahwa Series in this area is over 1,500 feet thick and consistE of many repetitive cyclothems formed by sequences of coal, shale, sandstone, and clay with occasional thin irregular limestone beds (Hennen and others, 1914) . Along Middle Fork, three cyclothems involving the Cedar Grove, Chilton, and Coalburg coals are present. Of these, only the Cedar Grove and Chilton are of concern in the failure of the dam and the subsequent flood; the Coal burg lies near the top of the ridges and is a hundred feet or more above the floor of Middle Fork. The following sequence is exposed in the lower part of the Middle Fork: 4 Mine No.5.
Thickness (feet)
Chilton upper coal, with intervening s} ale beds and fire clay, coal beds up to 3 feet tlick --------15 Shale and some sandstone -
Chilton lower coal and intervening shale beds, coal up to 18 inches thick; coal stripped and The beds dip gently to the northwest about 66 feet per mile (1.3 percent). Major fractures trending N. 80° E. and N. l0°E. cut the sandstone units. Joints at N. 55°W. and N. 30° W. are prominent.
The floors of the narrow, steep-sided hollows contain only coarse stony debris except where they have been filled with coal waste. The flats along Buffalo Creek are underlain by tightly packed, rounded cobbles and pebbles of sandstone and by sandy silt up to 1 or 2 feet thick. Bedrock in the valley is from 4 to 20 feet beneath the surface.
The valley flat along Buffalo Creek has been cleared of most of its natural vegetation. The valley walls and uplands are covered by continuous but thin growth of second stand timber, most of which is· less than 3 inches in diameter in the lower trunk. Oak, hickory, honey locust, yellow locust, pine, and some hemlock are present. Three strip mine benches interrupt the vegetation along both sides of Middle Fork. Except where the benches are used as roads, they are overgrown with brush and s·mall trees.
HISTORY AND GROWTH OF A COAL-WASTE DAM THAT FAILED
Mining activities began in Middle Fork in 1945 when the Lorado Mining Co. opened Mine No. 5 and accelerated when the preparation plant was completed 2 years later. In 1964, the property was acquired by the Buffalo Mining Co., which in turn was taken over by the Pittston Co., in 1970 (Park and others, 1972) .
In 1972 the preparation plant, on Buffalo Creek about half a mile east of Saunders, was handling about 5,000 tons of raw coal.per twoshift day from five mines, a strip bench, and two auger operations carried on by the Pittston Company. The preparation plant produced about 1,000 tons of solid coal-waste refuse each two-shift day and used in its cleaning pro'?.ess about a half million gallons of water per day, most of which was reused after the solids were settled out.
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The Lorado Mining Co., began trucking refuse from the preparation plant to the mouth of Middle Fork about 25 years ago, and in the process, it built a large waste bank across the hollow. By 1966, waste bank No. 1 exterded 1,500 feet down the Middle Fork and was 200 feet high at the face qn Buffalo Creek.
In 1959, the company began pumping waste water into the hollow behind the bank to s·~ttle out solids from the spent wash water. At first the water drained rapidly through the l'"lnk in spite of several attempts to create a reservoir for use in dry seasons. However, r.fter 1960, coal from strip-mine operations was processed through the washer. The fine material from the strip mines made the bank less pervious, resulting in a large impoundn1ent. Water was then decanted from the large settling pool that formed into smaller clear p·:mds for recycling in the ,preparation process. Between 400,000 and 500,000 gallons per day containing about 500 tons of solids were punped to the settling pool. Before using pools for settlement of waste material, the sludge effluent was discharged into Buffalo Creek. When rtate regulations concerning pollution of streams were enacted in the early 1950's, the company chose first to put the sludge undergrouiJd in mined out areas and later used impoundment and decanting basins as one of several po~·sible methods of meeting requirements.
INSPECTION OF COAL-WASTE BANK
The Geological Survey first examined the coal-waste bank at Saunders· in December 1966. On October 21 of that year, a large hillside waste bank at Aberfan, Wales (U.K.), slunped, sending a mass of liquified coal refuse 1,600 feet down the hill. Concerned over the prospect that such a thing might happen in the United States, the U.S. Bureau of Mines drew on the experience of its many mine ins:prctors to prepare lists of all waste banks in the Appalachians that, because of their location anc 1 size, could cause loss of life or property if they slid in a manner similar to the bank at Aberfan. Several hours were spent on the top of the bank, examining the material and method of deposition. Additional time was spent examining the sides along the haul road down to the north face, the large pond behind the waste bank, the small dike on the east that added to the height of the impounding structure, the north face of the bank, and the seepage issuing near the base of the structure. It was concluded that the waste bank at Saunders was stable as far as large slides were concerned but was subject to large washout on the north side from overflow of lake.
Observations on the engineering geology aspects of coal-waste banks were later des·cribed in two reports. The first report covered the geological aspects of coal-waste banks and was presented on November 21, 1967, to the Annual Meeting of the Geological Society . of
America (Davies, 1967 ). An exranded report with considerable emphasis on the dangers from failure of waste banks acting as impounding structures was later present<'d to a meeting of the American Mining Congress (Davies, 1968) . GROWTH OF COAL-WASTE BANKS, 1966 With 1,000 tons of waste dum11ed daily, the deposits in Middle Fork grew rapidly. Within a year after the 1966 inspection, the waste bank had increased in elevation by 50 feet, and the pool behind it had been filled with material settled from wash water. A second, larger pool had been formed in 1967 by a dam created from coal waste placed on the older sludge (figs. 3, 4, and 5). In 1966, t1'is dam was merely a small dump on the left wall of the valley about 600 feet upstream from the dike at the south end of the waste bank. However, in late 1967, this dam was completed and could impound water to a depth of about 20 feet above the old sludge line of the first pool. This dam and the retaining dike at the rear of the coal-waste bank were overtopped and partially carried away by high water from snowmelt early in 1967. A small flood occurred in Buffalo Creek as a consequence. Within 2 years, the limit of this second pool to settle material from wash water was in sight, and a third pool was e~tablished by dumping coal waste on the sludge trapped in the 1959 and 1967 1972, dam No. 3 extended 465 feet across the valley along its front (downstream) crest, was 450 feet wide at the rear, and up to 550 feet wide along the center. From fronf to back along the compacted crest, it was 360 feet thick on the right and 480 feet thick on the.-left (looking downstream). On the right, the compacted crest rose 44 feet, and on the left, it rose 60 feet above the level of the sludge in pond No. 2. The compacted crest on the front (downstream) face was about 10 to 15 feet lower than the rear (upstream) face. Altogether, dam No. 3 contained about 10 million cubic feet of coal waste standing above the level of the sludge line of pool No. 2 and about 7 million cubic feet displacing the sludge below that line. About 800,000 tons of coal waste had been dumped to form the dam. The front face of the dam sloped 37°, the angle of repose for most coal-waste material, and the 7 back sloped 32°, the angle of repose for such material where dumping was modified by impounded water. The front (northwest) face of the dam, based on an aerial photograph taken November 3, 1971 (fig. 6 ), was concave in plan and contained four small concave hollows. The rear face was nearly straight, except near the right abutment where a reentry cut diagonally into the dam.
Most dams constructed from coal waste impound water only during periods of heavy rain or during periods of large volume waste-water discharge. However, in the case of dam No. 3, there is evidence that a pool with a depth of about 30 feet at the dam endured for a long period of time. , the compacted crest In constructing dam No. 3, the coal waste over which the trucks moved stood 60 feet was dumped from trucks in closely spaced above the sludge level on the left abutment and piles from 4 to 7 feet high and then graded sloped gradually to 44 feet above the sludge in layers 2 to 4 feet thick. The dumping was level on the right abutment. In addition, the carried across the dam in the form of "lifts" rear part of the dam, mainly on the right half, on successive levels of material 10 to 20 feet was covered with abutting piles of recently thick. Once the dam was closed, dumping was dumped but ungraded coal rising 4 to 7 feet mainly across the back side of the dam, which above the compacted crest. steadily grew upstream. Trees in the path of Based on what remains in the abutments, the dam construction were not removed but the material within dam No. 3 was relatively were covered by dumping. The pool area also homogeneous. Well-sorted segments consistwas not cleared of vegetation. The sludge on ing primarily of fine coal were confined to diswhich the waste was dumped was only par-continuous layers less than 6 inches thick and tially displaced and much of it formed the to pockets and lenses up to 1 foot thick and foundation of the dams. It is probable that 10 feet long. No segregation, layering, or zonthe amounts of sludge underneath the dams ing of material to obtain maximum stability were proportional to the original thickness of occur in the remnants of the dam, and considthe sludge. Underneath dam No. 2, the sludge ering the method of construction, these feais probably on the order of 100 feet thick and tures were probably lacking in ihe rest of the 8 dam. The coal waste forming the dam was about 20 percent slabs {up to 2 ft on a side) of clayey shale and low-grade (bone) coal, 50 percent chips and chunks {up to 1 in. on a side), and 30 percent fine coal and sludge. Particle-size distribution obtained from one sample in the right abutment, two samples in the left abutment, and a sample in a mound heaved up at the toe of the front of the dam are comparably homogeneous with a graded distribution ranging from boulders to silt with a mean in the 5-to 10-m (fine gravel) category ( fig.  7) . The amount of fine coal mixed in the other material in the dam varies according to grain size and ranged from 24 to 7 4 percent (table 1). Slabs and chips of shale and coal were bonded by clay in the right abutment. This material was high in sulfides, and a light-gray efflorescence of sulfates was deposited along fractures and on faces of slabs and chips. 
The material remaining in the left abutment of dam No. 3 was bonded by clayey naterial but was relatively low in sulfates. Only thin, discontinuous effluorescences were present on the upper part of this abutment. The shale in both abutments was slaking rapidly and breaking down to chips and flakes less than 1 inch in maximum dimension. The slabs remaining in the abutments were randomly oriented, and bedding or layering was not discernible. Undisturbed samples for use in determining bulk density and percent voids could not be collected because of the presence of numerous large slabs of shale in the dam. Four sam]ples weighing 11 to 19 pounds were collected !for unit-weight (bulk-density) studies under th'ree degrees of repacking (table 2) . Observations indicate that the materials in the dam have a unit weight similar to that of the medium pack. Thus specific weight would range from 86 to 98 pounds per cubic foot, which is significantly less than the 112 to 125 pounds per cubic foot for soils derived from various Appalachian shales and much less than the specific weight of compacted fills. Percent of void space of the medium pack, interpreted from that in ~the solid pack, would be on the order of 20 td 22 percent, which is up to 50 percent greater than that of soils derived from Appalachian shales. Visual inspection indicated that the ooal waste in clam No. 3 had undergone little compaction after grading and being crossed by heavy trucks. However, compared to most waste banks, this small degree of compaction appeared to be significantly higher. In addition, the permeability appeared to be less than in many similar waste banks.
Dam No. 3 had no open or overfall type of spillway. Excess water was apparently taken care of by seepage through the dam and dr~in age was augmented by an overflow pipe :reportedly placed in July 1971 and extend~ng from the right rear of the structure diagon~lly to near the center of the downstream face. The pipe, reported to be 4 to 7 feet below the graqed crest, was 24 inches in diameter and made of 10 butt-welded 14-inch steel. After the failure of the dam, two segments of the pipe protruded above the debris. The segment on the right side is about 170 feet downstream from the toe of the right abutment and 50 feet from tl'~ valley wall. It protrudes downstream at a true azimuth of 350° (azimuth of the axis of the valley is 310°) and slopes 12° downwards to tho. south (upstream). The exposed part of the pipe showed no damage from movement in th~ flood. Sediment occupied all but 6 inches of the pipe, and the top of the sediment fill was flat and parallel to the surface of the pipe. This would indicate the filling was from material carried through the pipe and deposited in it while the pipe was in a relatively horizontal position. The lack of filling from flood debris can be accounted for in that the pipe opening was in the direction of flow protecting it from direct deposition. This part of the pipE: had a hard thin crust of a former fill that occupied about half ·of the inner circumference and was not in accord with the present fill, indicating that the pipe had been cleared previously of an accumulation of sediment and then reset.
Another segment of pipe is f.xposed near the front of the left abutment. A bout 12 feet of this pipe protrudes at a truE: azimuth of 200 o, slopes downwards to the northeast at 20°, and shows no sign of distortion. Most of the fill at the top of this pipe is apparently from the flood because the fill occupies almost the entire inside and is nearly horizontal with respect to the final position of th~ pipe. However, the small part of the second pipe not filled with sediments shows evilJence of an opening deeper in the pipe similar to that described for the first pipe.
Whether or not the two parts of pipe are continuous cannot be established at this time. It is probable that the pipe is not a single unit, and the buried part probably is fractured and otherwise disrupted. There is no evidence that the pipe had a protective collar or facing at its upstream end when it was in the c 1 am, nor does it appear to have had batHes along it to curtail seepage.
A fourth dam stretches across Middle Fork about 2,600 feet upstream from the maximum pool impounded by dam No.3. D".m No.4, an earthen dam constructed mainly of shale with coal waste, rises 25 feet above the bed of Middle Fork. The dam is about 200 feet long, and its crest ranges in width from 10 feet near the west side to over 40 feet on the east. The area behind the dam is filled with silt and coal waste and no water is impounded. A spillway on bedrock is on the left (west) side of the dam.
SOURCE OF FLOODWATER
Three possible sources of water could have contributed significantly to the Buffalo Creek flood: heavy runoff from melting snow, heavy runoff from locally intense cloudburst rainfall in any of the streams tributary to Buffalo Creek, and water released from the reservoir on Middle Fork following failure of coal-waste dam No. 3. As will be shown, the failure of dam No. 3 on Middle Fork contributed almost all of the peak floodflow in Buffalo Creek; direct runoff from snowmelt or rainfall and inflow from tributaries other than Middle Fork were not significant.
SNOWMELT
Residents of the Buffalo Creek hollow discount the importance of the snow cover in producing the flood flow. They report that by the end of February snow cover was limited to scattered drifts mainly on the northern slopes of the higher hills. According to the National Weather Service, the last snowstorm reported prior to the flood dropped about 1.5 inches of snow at Logan on February 19-20. On February 25, the day before the flood, very little snow was visible in the hills.
PRECIPITATION
During the 72-hour period immediately preceding the flood, precipitation averaged 3.7 inches at Logan and at other stations 15-20 miles south and east of Buffalo Creek, according to the National Weather Service (fig. 8 ). About half of the rainfall (1.9 in.) at Logan fell in the 24 hours that preceded the flood. Precipitation tapered off to the north during the 3-day period, measuring 2.35 inches in Charleston. Maximum precipitation during the storm was 4.5 inches produced at Williamson, 22 miles west of Buffalo Creek. A bucket sur-11 Feb. 24 to Feb. 26, 1972. vey in the Buffalo Creek hollow conductE.d by field parties during the week following the flood revealed no catchment of precipitation in open cans and other available containers that exceeded 3.7 inches recorded at Logan. According to National Weather Service estimates, 3.7 inches of rain in 3 days is about a 2-year rainfall; that is, southwestern West Virginia can expect precipitation to equal or exceed 3. 7 inches in a 3-day period over a long-term average of once every 2 year.:o. In fact, precipitation exceeding 3.7 inches in a 2 or 3 day period has been measured at Logan eight times in the last 17 years. Indirect Jneasurements of peak discharges of streams tributary to Buffalo Creek and inspection of streams near the Buffalo Creek basin produced no evidence of sudden high flows from cloudburst rainfall.
In conclusion, February was a slightly wetter month than normal; total precipitation at Logan during the month was 4.56 inche~, 1.2 inches above the 30-year average. Altr0ugh the storm of February 24-26 dumped most of its precipitation during the 24 hours immediately preceding the flood, no evidence was found of large cloudburst rainfalls that could contribute the large volume of water needed to produce the flash flood on Middle Fork and Buffalo Creek. The only available source of water large enough to produce the flood was the pool of water behind coal-waste dam No. 3 on the Middle Fork.
POOL ON MIDDLE FORK
Information on inflow and characteristics of the pool behind coal-waste dam No. 3 were determined from field surveys and interviews with local residents. The pool reached its qtaximum volume, about 17.6 million cubic feet of water and sludge, around 8 :00 a.m. on Saturday, February 26 ( fig. 9 ). At that time the water-surface elevation had risen to 1,753.1 feet above mean sea level, and the depth of water in the pool just upstream of the coalwaste dam was 4 7.3 feet. The surface area of the pool at the time of the dam failure was 14.2 acres ( fig. 10) , and the pool extended 2,100 feet up the Middle Fork valley.
Slightly less than half the contents of the pool was sludge. The top of the sludge line in the pool stood at an elevation of 1,733.6 :feet m.s.l. (mean sea level). At that elevation, the volume of sludge was 8.4 million cubic feet and the surface area was 10.3 acres. There are two known sources of inflow to the pool: natural drainage from Middle Fork basin, and water pumped from nearby mines and from the washing plant loc;;-.ted one-half mile east of the mouth of Middle Fork. Inflow from natural drainage is the principal source of inflow. Information furnished by local residents indicates that pumping, if there was pumping during the storm perioi, would not contribute significantly to the inflow. As much as 25,000 cubic feet per day might be pumped, an insignificant amount when compared to total pool volume of 17.6 million cubic feet.
Middle Fork drains an area of 1.18 square miles, 1.1 square miles of which is above coalwaste dam No.3. Peak inflow during the storm period and rate of rise of pool contents are estimated from interviews with n1ine-company personnel and from indirect measurements on other small drainage areas in the Buffalo Creek basin near Middle Fork.
At 4:00 p.m. Thursday, February 24, a local mining-company employee placed a measuring stick on the lowest point of the back (upstream) side of coal-waste dam No. 3 so that the top of the stick was approximately 1 foot below the compacted part of the dam. This employee visited the dam frequently between 4 :00 p.m. Thursday and 4 :30 a.m. Saturday, observing the rate of rise of the pool. Analysis of the observations indicate a rise of slightly less than 1 inch per hour on Thursday afternoon, increasing to about 3 inches per hour by 3:00 a.m. Saturday. Using the stage-volume curve shown in figure 9 and the observations made on the measuring stick, the rate of rise of the pool is shown in figure 11 .
Outflow from the reservoir cannot be reliably established from the information available. A 24-inch drain pipe (or pipes) is 
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reported to have been in place and carrying flow at the time of the dam failure. The exact position of this drain pipe in the dam and the true head on the pipe have not been ascertained. However, computations based or its location as reported by eyewitnesses yield a a peak flow through the pipe of about 10 cfs ( 4,500 gpm). Using the rate of change in contents relation developed in figure 11 and adjusting for outflow, the inflow graph shown in figuro. 12 was developed for the period 4:00 p.m. Tl'ursday, February 24, to 4:00 a.m. Saturday, February 26, when observations on the elevation of the impounded water were discontinued. The inflow curve does not include seepage through the dam. Maximum seepage, estimated at less than 10 cfs ( 4,500 gpm), would have occurred just prior to failure when the hydraulic gradient through the dam was the greatest. Peak inflow for the storm is estimated as 70 cfs (31,000 gpm) on the basis· of yield per square mile determined for several small tributaries in the Buffalo Creek basin near Middle Fork. Data collected at gaging station$ on surrounding streams show peaks on February 25 and 26 of nearly the same magnitude; ~ow ever, the peak discharge on Middle Fo~k is believed to have occurred on February 26f F AlLURE OF THE DAM Apparently there was no eyewitness to the actual failure of dam No. 3, although a number of people were in the vicinity of the dam just before and immediately after the failure. However, the evidence discernible in the remnants of the structure combined with reports of those at the dam before and after its failure serve well to establish the mode and timing of the failure.
GEOLOGIC AND ENGINEERING EVIDENCE
Slumps
The large volume of water passing through dam No. 3 has removed most of the evidence of slumps. However, a large dome-shaped mound, not eroded or scoured by water action, is at the toe or former front of the dam about 120 feet from the left abutment (figs. 13 and 14). The mound is about 100 feet in diameter and is cut by five tension cracks one-half inch to 1 inch wide and spaced ~ to 22 feet apart. The cracks trend 10° to: 20° true north azimuth in comparison with i the former front of the dam, which trended about 60°. The mound is apparently a remnant of a heave at the toe of a slump that moved diagonally to the left at the front of the dam.
Obvious large slump features are visible in of a series of beds of sludge, and the ridge forming units are separated by slippage planes. The floor of the breach at scour level shows two distinct sump features. Two sump holes, one about 3 feet in diameter and 2 feet deep and the other 6 feet in diameter and 4lj 2 feet in depth, indicate an outflow of water along the foundation or below it in tho. sludge base (figs. 13 and 15). These holes contain only coarse material; all the fine material has been removed by subterranean flow. A large subsidence feature is ,.,.isible on the left front of the former dam (fg. 16). This sump, about 80 feet in diameter and over 10 feet deep, was occupied by a large pool during the final stages of draining and is now filled with fine material. Both the rim and the outlet of the pool contain coarse, water-washed material, indicating that the pool ex~ends into the foundation to an unknown depth. The pool probably was formed by material being removed in the foundation during failure. This large area of subsidence is opposite the mouth of a small hollow that drained into the haul road at the left abutment. It is possible that water from this hollow entered ihe side of the remnants of both abutments. In gen¢ral, the dam, causing a large pocket of saturated these slumps are related to the final stag~ of material which gave rise to a slump and subfailure, and the fracture lines related to them sidence along the left side of the dam. are parallel to the abutments.
The sludge that formerly underlaid -pool were cut out by subsequent slumping. The third bench is 14 feet above the lowest flow line, is level, and is cut by an abrupt scarp about 70 feet from the sump pool. The fourth bench is 9 feet above the lowest flow line, is level, and ends in a cut scarp at the sump pool. The fifth bench is broad, covering the right half of the total breach, and is 3 to 5 feet above the lowest flow line. It slopes slightly downstream and is unbroken except by gullies at the lower end.
Debris Lines
A corridor strewn with slabs of sandstone extends from the valley wall at the rear of the right abutment diagonally across to the large gully at the center of the valley near the site of the front toe of dam No. 3. This sandstone, torn from the wall of the valley, is restricted to a zone 20 to 60 feet wide, is not present elsewhere in the debris from the dam, and is not covered by other debris. This evidence indicates that a strong linear flow persisted on the right side of the dam from the time the pool was at 48 feet until it had been reduced to near 10 feet. Flow through and over the rest of the dam was subordinate to flow through this opening.
EYEWITNESS OBSERVATIONS
Between 6 :00 and 6 :30 a.m. Saturday, one witness drove up from Saunders to check the water level behind the dam. "The dam was moving like a bridge moves under heavy traffic. Water was coming through the dam at 6 :30 a.m.-not much, but it was causing the lower lake to fill up fast. This water had cut the road below the dam [at dam No. 2], and they had a front-end loader trying to ditch the road." He also reported that dam No. 3 had sunk in some spots on the right side and that there were surface cracks running parallel with the face of the dam.
Another witness was checking the dam between 7 :30 a.m. and 8 :00 a.m. The water was coming up between the piles of slate (coal waste) that trucks had dumped. "I could see it coming into the holes on top of the dam. The top of the dam was moving back and forth-I could see that the front of the dam had broken off and was sliding in on the lower side. The dam was settling down and it was shoving forward. About 20 feet of the face had broken or slid off during the night." According to this witness, "It was like walking in soup, it had done gotten real juicy, buddy, all the way down. I got in the car and got the hell outta there." He reported sinking to his ankles in the saturated material on the graded crest of the dam.
Witnesses indicated the dam had a history of instability; it had slumped in the past and slate had been dumped to fill the low places. This was a recurring condition but was not considered to be dangerous; the water had never before been as high as it was on February 26, 1972. The 24-inch drain pipe placed a few feet below the top of the dam was "running full" but was inadequate for the heavy runoff of the last few days.
Another witness who was at dam No. 3 immediately after the failure indicates that water was pouring out and cutting away the dam from the right side. Then a larger portion of the dam broke loose toward the center. This break sent a mass of water and sludge onto the burning coal-waste bank No. 1, which brought on an explosion.
At the time of the failure, another witness was on his way home from the "Hoot Owl" shift. It was about 7 :56 a.m. Saturday morning. He was driving down the right side of the valley on the lower road above the reservoir behind dam No. 3. He had just made the last small curve and turned down the slope about 300 feet above the back side of the dam when his car was suddenly showered with black water containing fine black material. "My windshield and car were completely covered with black sludge-! knew she [the dam] had gone out! I looked and saw the road was gone and things were kicking up. I looked down the valley and saw the truck shop toss up and over and I saw a Dart [truck] go up and over. Then I turned around and went back to No. 5 mine to warn the people in the valley below. The phone was out."
A person staying with friends in a twostory frame house 600 feet up Buffalo Creek from the burning waste bank reported that ashes and coal dust blew down upon them as they came out of the back of the house to run up the hill after the burning bank blew up.
of water and sludge flowed out into the valley. A Saunders resident reported his electric "The wall of sludge and water was boiling up power went out at 8:00 a.m. and shortly after, like dry flour when you pour water on it." water came out of the lower waste bank and Several eyewitnesses indicated that company into the valley. He sent his family up the hill employees planned to place 24-inch metal pipes, and he went down to move his car; however, which were on hand at the dam, to drain water the water came up too fast and he was forced from the crest of the right side of the dam to run back across the railroad track and up to the diversion ditch along the haul road. Howthe hill. He turned and saw his house floating ever, before a bulldozer could be brought in to off its foundation. At about this time he saw aid in entrenching the pipe, the dam had the burning waste bank blow up. "The ex-failed. plosion looked like an atomic bomb and shook Wash from a small hollow was stated to the ground." Shortly thereafter the big crest be blocking the haul road and diversion ditch 18 From eyewitness reports, slumping of the face, subsidence of inner parts of coal-waste dam No.3, and heaves in pool No.2 below dam No. 3, had been recurring features for several months before the failure of the dam. The unevenness of the crest was smoothed out by dumping coal waste into the depressions resulting from these slumps and subsidences. Because the slumps and subsidences occurred in times of both high and low water, it is probable that they were related to movement in the sludge beneath or trapped within the dam. The apparent sequence of events on the night of February 25-26, 1972 , summarized below, are based on engineering-geology observations and eyewitness reports.
I
After 4 :30 a.m., February 26, conditions within dam No. 3 were such that failure was well underway. The phreatic surface (the top of the water-saturated material in the dam) had been driven forward until its upper surface was near or at the crest of the dam in the rear half of the structure. With increased head, the phreatic surface rapidly expanded and its front slope increased, probably to 6 : 1 or 7 : 1, and the margin of safety approached zero. The increase in head of the pool and in pore pressures during the preceding 24 hours had caused heaves, blowouts, and slump~ in the front of dam No. 3. Between 12:30 a.m. and 6 :30 a.m., increased saturation and pore pressure probably caused some swelling, uplift, and undulation of the surface of the dam. By 6 :30 a.m., the pressure was probably reduced by fracture and upheaval of the dam as indicated by eyewitness accounts concerning the undulation of the surface of the dam and its soupy condition. Within the next hour, extensive slumping and subsidence apparently set in, causing some lowering of the crest of the dam.
At 6 :30 a.m., February 26, water was seeping through the coal piles at the rear of the crest adding to the saturation of the upper layers of the dam. Several large subsidence holes had developed on the crest. Some of the water from this upper saturated zone drained across the right abutment along bulldozer tracks and flowed around the dam and down the haul road. In one rut, this flow was up to 14 inches wide and 1% inches deep ( fig. 17) 3 was cut by cracks extending from abutment to abutment parallel to the faces. Water was rising to the crest through these fractures and other holes. The front of the dam was sliding off and the crest was lowering noticeably. Apparently by this time pore pressure had passed the maximum, the flow line within the bank was near the crest, and the entire right side of the dam was buoyant and was being driven to the downstream face. The pore pressure was further relieved by internal slippage and slumping that finally produced total failure through overtopping of the slumped blocks.
Total failure occurred about 7 :59 a.m. when the right side of the dam breached along a line starting about 120 feet from the front of the right abutment and trending diagonally towards the valley wall at the rear. Extreme turbulence threw coal-laden water 300 feet from the dam and splattered cars on the haul road. Within seconds, dam No. 2 was topped on both the right and left sides, the existing breach on its right abutment was enlarged, and the sludge behind was thrown into great convolutions by the slump blocks ( fig. 18) The torrent of water crossed the haul road at the south end of the burning coal-waste bank No. 1, but the compacted road bed was only slightly eroded ( fig. 20) . At the lower end of the burning coal-waste bank, the water increased the hydrostatic pressure within the bank, causing explosions of steam and producer-type gas. The three or four explosions reported were severe enough to shake the ground at Saunders and raise mushroomshaped clouds of ash and smoke. Moments later, at about 8:01 a.m., the torrent of water en- 
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tered Buffalo Creek. The cascading torrent followed an existing depression within the coal-waste bank at the front, which curved abruptly to the west. This abrupt curve diverted part of the initial surge towards the church at the mouth of Lee Fork. Another part of the flow followed the haul road as far as 100 feet east of the curve at the mouth of the hollow, trenching the road to a depth of 4 feet, cascading over the slope to Buffalo Creek, and carrying away much of the soil. The barrier that formed the abrupt curve at the mouth of the hollow was quickly demolished, and immediately a surge crossed the valley of Buffalo Creek and rose 37 feet up the north wall of the valley. This sudden rise was dissipated within 400 feet downstream and 100 feet upstream. Backwater with fine debris flowed about 500 feet east into Buffalo Creek above Middle Fork. After the initial surge, the flow into Buffalo Creek was relatively uniform, controlled by the breach in dam No. 2 and the constriction between coalwaste bank No. 1 and the valley wall along the haul road. In the area of explosions, the torrent cut through the haul road forming a canyon 40-50 feet deep, 700 feet long, up to 30 feet wide at the bottom ( figs. 21 and 22) .
Meanwhile, at dam No. 3, the torrent from the initial linear failure was great enough to tear sandstone from the valley walls along the rear of the right abutment ( fig. 23 ). The failure spread across the dam to the left side and large slump blocks were carried away at the center of the dam, almost simultaneously as the initial linear failure developed.
Moments after the linear failure developed, a large subsidence and slump apparently occurred in the front half of the dam near the left abutment. Slumps from this failure rapidly extended across the front of the dam connecting with those in the center. The overflow pipe was carried away in these failures; the lower (front) end came to rest below the right abutment and upper (rear) end moved across the site of the dam, ending up near the front left abutment ( fig. 13) .
By the time the pool had been reduced by about 9 feet to the 39-foot level, the water was flowing across all but approximately 50 feet of the left abutment, and the water-surface Flow along the center and right continued until the pool was reduced to a 5-foot level and the water gradient was level. The final discharge from the pool began at the center but was diverted to the left abutment by further slump and subsidence along the left front and by a heave that had occurred at the toe of the lower face near the center (figs. 14 and A brief but very heavy rainfall apparently occurred in the vicinity of Lee Fork, within 30 minutes after dam No. 3 broke. As a result of this rainfall, two debris avalanches, one involving some 225,000 cubic feet and the other some 30,000 cubic feet of debris, descended into Buffalo Creek from hollows just to the 
Ditching
A witness reported that a company official had checked conditions at the dam the morning of the failure. The witness was informed by the official that "he was ditching around the dam and it was safe." Field evidence and eyewitness reports indicate the ditching was done on the haul road at the right abutment of dam No. 2, which is located below the dam (No. 3) that actually failed and released the floodwater. This ditching and mounding were done by a front-end loader to divert water from a side hollow and the haul road around dam No. 2. There is no conclusive evidence that alteration at the surface of dam No. 3 was made by ditching or scraping, either during or immediately before the failure of dam No.3.
Dynamiting
A press story attributed the failure of the dam to company personnel dynamiting the top of the dam in an attempt to drain off the pool. Evidence cited included blasting wire and drill holes at the site. All wire seen at the site was telephone wire or used waste-blasting wire deposited in the banks along with other refuse from mines. The drill holes were in sandstone and were remnants of blasting operations during construction of the haul road several years ago. Television pictures of the reported site of dynamiting were made at the canyon cut in coal-waste bank No. 1 and were about 2,600 feet downstream from the site of the actual dam failure at coal-waste dam No. 3. Wire at this point shown in the television film is telephone wire; blasting holes were those related to building the haul road. 
CONCLUSIONS AS TO CAUSE OF DAM FAILURE
Five causes led to the failure of coal-waste dam No. 3:
1. The dam was not designed or constructed to withstand the potential head of water that · could be impounded. It was primarily a waste pile that grew from routine dumping of waste.
2. Spillway and other adequate water-level controls were not in the dam, and no provision had been made for removing water once it had entered the pool behind the dam. The capacity of the 24-inch pipe was too small to handle large flows, and the pipe was placed so high that water rising to it greatly increased instability of the dam.
3. The sludge on which the dam was placed was inadequate as a foundation. Seepage through the foundation gave rise to extensive removal of material (piping) . The weak foundations also gave rise to extensive slumps and subsidence which led to the initial breach and overtopping.
4. The great thickness of the dam (from front to back) in relation to height without engineered compaction led to a decrease rather than an increase in the stability of the dam. The thickness, along with some relatively small compaction, impeded seepage through the bank and thus produced a higher phreatic surface. The high phreatic surface was reflected in sat- uration of the dam and the resulting buoyancy accelerated the failure. The impediments to internal drainage also limited the effectiveness of seepage in regulating the height of the impoundment.
5. The dam was constructed of coal waste, including fine coal, shale, clay, and mine rubbish. This material disintegrates rapidly, is high in soluble sulfates which reduce bonding strength, is noncohesive, and does not compact uniformly. A safe, economical dam could not be constructed from such material alone.
The full contribution of the pipe to the failure of dam No. 3 cannot be established from evidence now available, but the fill found in the pipe opens to question the effectiveness of the pipe as a drain control, and the lack of a collar and batHes greatly increased the chance of seepage being carried along the outside of the pipe deep into the dam. (table 3) .
The gaging station on the Guyandotte River at Man, located 500 feet upstream from the mouth of Buffalo Creek, recorded peak stages of 18.65 feet on February 25 and 19.34 and 19.02 feet on February 26. The peak discharge for February 25 was 29,600 cfs (13 million gallons per minute), an 8-year flood. The peak stage of 19.34 feet was a direct result of inflow from Buffalo Creek following the failure 
